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 Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) is one of the most widely used decision 
methodologies in the sciences, business, and engineering worlds. MCDM methods aim at 
improving the quality of decisions by making the process more explicit, rational, and 
efficient. One intriguing problem is that oftentimes different methods may yield different 
answers to the same decision problem. Thus, the issue of evaluating the relative performance 
of different MCDM methods is raised. One evaluating procedure is to examine the stability of 
an MCDM method’s mathematical process by checking the validity of its proposed rankings.  
The ELECTRE II and III methods are two well-known MCDM methods and widely 
accepted in solving MCDM problems in civil and environmental engineering. However these 
two methods have never been studied in detail for the validity of their proposed rankings. 
Thus, the first aim of this thesis is to examine if these two methods suffer of any type of 
ranking irregularities and analyze the reasons of the phenomenon.  
As the research results in this thesis revealed, the ELECTRE II and III methods do 
allow some types of ranking irregularities to happen. For instance, these two methods might 
change the indication of the best alternative for a given MCDM problem when one of the 
non-optimal alternatives was replaced by a worse one. The two methods were also evaluated 
in terms of two other ranking tests and they failed them as well. Two real-life cases are 
described to demonstrate the occurrence of rank reversals. Then reasons behind the 
phenomenon are analyzed. Next an empirical study and some real-life case studies were 
executed and discussed. The results of these examinations show that the rates of those ranking 
irregularities were rather significant in both the simulated decision problems and the real-life 
cases studied in this research. 
However, some recent studies showed that rank reversals could also happen because 
people may reverse their preferences due to some emotional feelings, like regret and 
rejoicing. Thus this thesis proposes a new MCDM method which is based on regret and 


























1. Problem Description  
 
Making all kinds of decisions is an indispensable part of our lives. From the ancient 
times to the modern age, people never stopped their efforts in seeking ways for making more 
reliable and scientifically sound decisions. For those daily life decision problems, one may 
quickly decide them just by using his/her personal preferences, experiences, and/or instincts. 
However, in many fields of engineering, business, government, and sciences, where decisions 
may be worth millions or billions of dollars, or decisions may have a significant impact on the 
welfare of the society, decision-making problems are usually too complex and anything but as 
easy. 
  
For instance, many large companies and organizations face the problem of 
prioritizing a set of competing projects.  Each one of these projects may have some short-term 
and long-term potential profits, costs and some negative or positive side effects.  At the same 
time, there is a limited budget to be distributed among these projects.  Some of the projects 
may not get funded at all.  Besides these projects, the decision makers have also defined some 
criteria to be used to study these projects in depth. The problem underlined in the above 
situation is how to use all available information and assign priorities to these competing 
projects or decision alternatives.  This is a pervasive problem in today’s highly sophisticate 
world. When faced with such decision making problems, no single decision maker or group 
of decision makers can systematically consider all the available information simultaneously 
and reach the right decisions by just using their experiences or instincts. For such case people 
need to use valid decision analysis approaches and tools to analyze all the issues involved and 
eventually to reach the optimal decisions.  They need to do so in a way that can be easily and 
objectively explained to others and be defended to a wide audience of stakeholders.  This is 
how and why the field of decision sciences has emerged as an important scientific discipline 
for today’s complex world. 
 
In the past few decades, numerous decision-making methods and decision aid 
software packages have been proposed in the literature and are used in various areas. Among 
them, a class of methods known as multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) is one of the 
most widely used decision methodologies in the sciences, business, and engineering worlds. 
MCDM methods aim at improving the quality of decisions by making the decision-making 
process more explicit, rational, and efficient. It is not a coincidence that a simple search (for 
instance, by using google.com) on the web under the key words “multi criteria decision 
making” returns more than ten million hits. Some applications of MCDM include the use in 
civil and environmental engineering [Zavadskas, et al., 2004; Hobbs and Meier, 2000], like 
water resources planning [Raj, 1995], in financial engineering [Zopounidis and Doumpos, 
2000], like credit risk assessment [Doumpos, et al., 2002] and in some current problems like 
flood management for flood hazard mitigation [Jason, et al., 2007] and allocation of scarce 
homeland security resources for economic efficiency and maximum protection [Farrow and 
Valverde, 2005] etc. 
 
Although MCDM has attracted the interest of researchers and practitioners for many 
years in a wide spectrum of areas, it is far from mature and there are still a lot of unsolved 
issues. One intriguing problem with MCDM methods is that oftentimes different methods 
may yield different answers when they are fed with exactly the same decision problem. Thus, 
the issue of evaluating the relative performance of different MCDM methods is naturally 
raised. This, in turn, raises the question of how can one evaluate the performance of different 
MCDM methods?  Since it is practically impossible to know which one is the best alternative 
for a given decision problem, some kind of testing procedures need to be developed. One such 
procedure is to examine the stability of an MCDM method’s mathematical process by 
checking the validity of its proposed rankings. The development of this procedure of 
evaluating the performance of different MCDM methods comes from some studies on some 
MCDM methods [Belton and Gear, 1983; Dyer and Wendell, 1985; Triantaphyllou, 2000]. In 
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these studies, the original additive AHP method, one of the most well-known MCDM 
methods, was found to allow some rank reversal problems to happen.  
 
Rank reversal means that the ranking between two alternatives might be reversed 
after some variation occurs to the decision problem, like adding a new alternative, dropping 
an old alternative or replacing an old alternative by a worse one, etc. For example, two 
alternatives A1 and A2 may be initially ranked as A1 > A2 (i.e., A1 is more preferable than A2). 
After a new alternative A3 is introduced into the decision problem and the alternatives are 
ranked again by using the same method, the ranking between A1 and A2 may be reversed and 
become A2 > A1. (For a detailed rank reversal example, please refer to Chapter 2). Usually 
such rank reversals are undesirable for decision-making problems when they are totally 
caused by the mathematical instabilities of the used method. Cases of rank reversals and some 
other types of ranking irregularities when the AHP is used have been reported by many 
researchers for a number of years [Belton and Gear, 1983; Dyer and Wendell, 1985; 
Triantaphyllou, 2000]. However there are very few studies which examine the validity of the 
ranking results from some other widely used MCDM methods.  
 
 The ELECTRE method is another type of well-known MCDM method, especially in 
Europe. Among different variants of the ELECTRE method, the ELECTRE II and III 
methods have been widely accepted in solving MCDM problems in the engineering world, 
like civil and environmental engineering [Hobbs and Meier, 2000]. Applications include the 
assessment of complex civil engineering projects, selection of highway designs, site selection 
for the disposal of nuclear waste and nuclear plant [Roy and Bouyssou, 1986], water resources 
planning [Raj, 1995] and solid waste management [Hokkanen and Salminen, 1997]. Though 
there have been so many publications which reported the applications of these two MCDM 
methods, the ELECTRE II and III methods have never been studied in detail for the validity 
of their proposed rankings. Thus, the first goal of this research is to examine if the ELECTRE 
II and III methods suffer of any type of ranking irregularity problems and analyze the reasons 
behind the phenomenon.  
 
This thesis is organized as follows: the second chapter presents a literature review on 
MCDM and some past studies on rank reversals with the AHP methods. The third chapter 
discusses the three test criteria that are used in this thesis to test the performance of the 
ELECTRE II and III methods. The fourth chapter describes two examples of real-life decision 
problems for which rank reversals occurred under test criterion #1 by using the ELECTRE II 
and III methods. The fifth chapter presents a detailed analysis on the reasons for the rank 
reversal problems with the ELECTRE II and III methods. Next the sixth chapter discusses the 
results from an empirical study on randomly generated decision problems according to the 
three test criteria described in chapter 3. Then the results of some real-life case studies are 
described in the seventh chapter. In the eighth chapter, some ongoing studies on the influence 
of regret and rejoicing to MCDM problems are discussed and a new MCDM method is 













2. Introduction to MCDM and Literature Review 
 
A typical MCDM problem is concerned with the task of ranking a finite number of 
decision alternatives, each of which is explicitly described in terms of different characteristics 
(also often called attributes, decision criteria, or objectives) which have to be taken into 
account simultaneously. Usually, the performance values aij and the criteria weights wj are 
viewed as the entries of a decision matrix as shown below. The aij element of the decision 
matrix represents the performance value of the i-th alternative in terms of the j-th criterion. 
The wj value represents the weight of the j-th criterion. Data for MCDM problems can be 
determined by direct observation (if they are easily quantifiable) or by indirect means if they 
are qualitative [Triantaphyllou, et al., 1994].  
     C r i t e r i a 
    C1           C2       ... Cn   
    (w1  w2  ... wn) 
  Alternatives ________________________  
   A1 a11    a12  ...  a1n  
   A2 a21    a22     ... a2n 
    . .         . ... . 
    . .  . … . 
    . . . … . 
   Am am1    am2     ... amn   
 
 
From the early developments of the MCDM theories in the 1950s and 1960s, a 
plethora of MCDM methods have been proposed in the literature and new contributions are 
continuously coming forth in this area. There are also many ways to classify the existing 
MCDM methods. One of the ways is to classify MCDM methods according to the type of 
data they use. Thus, there are deterministic, stochastic, or fuzzy MCDM methods 
[Triantaphyllou, 2000]. Another way of classifying MCDM methods is according to the 
number of the decision makers involved in the decision process. Hence, there are single 
decision maker MCDM methods and group decision-making MCDM. For some 
representative articles in this area, see [George, et al., 1992], [Hackman and Kaplan, 1974], 
and [DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987]. 
 
2.1 Some Well-known MCDM Methods 
 
Among the numerous MCDM methods, there are several prominent families that 
have enjoyed a wide acceptance in the academic area and many real-world applications. Each 
of these methods has its own characteristics, background logic and application areas. Next is a 
brief description of some of them.  
 
2.1.1 The Analytic Hierarchy Process and Some of Its Variants 
 
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (or AHP) method was developed by Professor 
Thomas Saaty [Saaty, 1980; Saaty, 1994; Saaty and Vargas, 2000]. This decision-making 
method can help people set priorities and choose the best alternatives by reducing complex 
decision problems to a system of hierarchies. Since its inception, it has evolved into several 
different variants and has been widely used to solve a broad range of multi-criteria decision 
problems [Vaidya and Kumar, 2006].  
 
2.1.1.1 The Original Analytic Hierarchy Process 
 
  The AHP method uses the pairwise comparisons and eigenvector methods to 
determine the aij values and also the criteria weights wj. The details about the pairwise 
comparisons and eigenvector methods can be found in [Saaty, 1980; Saaty, 1994; Saaty and 
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Vargas, 2000].  In this method, aij represents the relative value of alternative Ai when it is 
considered in terms of criterion Cj. In the original AHP method, the aij values of the decision 
matrix need to be normalized vertically. That is, the elements of each column in the decision 
matrix add up to 1. In this way, values with various units of measurement can be transformed 
into dimensionless ones. If all the criteria are benefit criteria (that is, the higher the score the 
better the performance is), then according to the original AHP method, the best alternative is 





AHP i ij j
i i
j
P P a w
=
= = ∑ ,   for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., m.  (2-1) 
 From the above formula, it can be seen that the original AHP method uses an additive 
expression to determine the final priorities of the alternatives in terms of all the criteria 
simultaneously. Next the revised AHP is introduced, which is also an additive variant of the 
original AHP method. 
 
2.1.1.2 The Revised Analytic Hierarchy Process  
 
The revised AHP model was proposed by Belton and Gear in [1983] after they first 
found a case of rank reversal that occurred when the original AHP was used. In their case, the 
original AHP method was used to rank three alternatives in a simple test problem. Then a 
fourth alternative, identical to one of the three alternatives, was introduced in the original 
decision problem without changing any other data. The ranking of the original three 
alternatives was changed after the revised problem was ranked again by the same method.  
The following is this rank reversal example from [Belton and Gear, 1983].  
 
Suppose the decision matrix of a decision problem with three alternatives and three 
criteria is as follows:  
C r i t e r i a 
C1       C2        C3 
( 1/3         1/3         1/3 ) 
Alts.    ___________________ 
A1   1   9   8 
A2   9   1   9 
A3   1   1   1 
By using the original AHP method, the above decision matrix is normalized first by the 
column totals to get the relative data as follows: 
C r i t e r i a 
C1          C2          C3 
( 1/3         1/3         1/3 ) 
Alts.    ___________________ 
A1  1/11   9/11   8/18 
A2  9/11   1/11   9/18 
A3  1/11   1/11   1/18 
Then, it can be shown that the final AHP scores of the three alternatives are: (0.45, 0.47, 
0.08). That is, A2 > A1> A3. Next, a new alternative A4 which is identical to the existing 
alternative A2 is added to the decision matrix. Now the normalized decision matrix is as 
follows: 
C r i t e r i a 
C1          C2          C3 
( 1/3         1/3         1/3 ) 
Alts.    ___________________ 
A1  1/20   9/12   8/27 
A2  9/20   1/12   9/27 
A3  1/20   1/12   1/27 
A4  9/20   1/12   9/27 
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By using the same AHP method, now the final AHP scores of these alternatives are: (0.37, 
0.29, 0.06, 0.29). That is, the four alternatives are ranked as A1 > A2 =A4 > A3. This result 
contradicts the previous one in which A2 > A1.  
 
Later the above ranking abnormality was defined as a rank reversal. According to 
Belton and Gear the root for this inconsistency is the fact that the relative values of the 
alternatives for each criterion sum up to 1. So instead of having the relative values of the 
alternatives sum up to 1, they proposed to divide each relative value by the maximum value of 
the relative values. According to this variant, the aij values of the decision matrix need to be 
normalized by dividing the elements of each column in the decision matrix by the largest 
value in that column. As before, the best alternative is given again by the additive formula (2-





Revised AHP i ij j
i i
j
P P a w−
=
= = ∑ ,   for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., m.  (2-2) 
 
The revised AHP was sharply criticized by Saaty in [1990]. After many debates and a 
heated discussion (e.g., [Dyer, 1990a; and 1990b], [Saaty, 1983; 1987; and 1990], and 
[Harker and Vargas, 1990]), Saaty accepted this variant and now it is also called the ideal 
mode AHP [Saaty, 1994]. However, even earlier, the revised AHP method was found to 
suffer of some other ranking problems even without the introduction of identical alternatives 
[Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1989]. In that study and also in [Triantaphyllou, 2000; and 2001], 
it was found that most of the problematic situations of the AHP methods are caused by the 
required normalization (either by dividing by the sum of the elements or by the maximum 
value in a vector) and the use of an additive formula on the data of the decision matrix for 
deriving the final preference values of the alternatives. However, in the core step of one of the 
MCDM methods known as the Weighted Product Model (WPM) [Bridgeman, 1922; Miller 
and Starr, 1969], the use of an additive formula is avoided by using a multiplicative 
expression. This brought the development of a multiplicative version of the AHP method, 
known as the multiplicative AHP.  
  
2.1.1.3 The Multiplicative Analytic Hierarchy Process 
  
The use of multiplicative formulas in deriving the relative priorities in decision-
making is not new [Lootsma, 1991]. A critical development appears to be the use of 
multiplicative formulations when one aggregates the performance values aij with the criteria 
weights wj. In the WPM method, each alternative is compared with others in terms of a 
number of ratios, one for each criterion. Each ratio is raised to the power of the relative 
weight of the corresponding criterion. Generally, the following formula is used ([Bridgeman, 
1922; Miller and Starr, 1969]) in order to compare two alternatives AK and AL:  











=        
∏                                                (2-3) 
If R (AK / AL) ≥  1, then AK is more desirable than AL (for the maximization case). Then the 
best alternative is the one that is better than or at least equal to all other alternatives.  
 
Based on the WPM method, Barzilai and Lootsma [1994] and Lootsma [1999] 
proposed the multiplicative version of the AHP method. According to this method, the 
relative performance values aij and criteria weights wj are not processed according to formula 
(2-1), but the WPM formula (2-3) is used instead. Furthermore, one can use a variant of 
formula (2-3) to compute preference values of the alternatives that in turn, can be used to rank 
them. The preference values can be computed as follows: 








= ∏                                               (2-4) 
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Please note that if Pi > Pj, then Pi / Pj > 1, or equivalently, Pi – Pj > 0. That is, two alternatives 
Ai and Aj can be compared in terms of their preference values Pi and Pj by forming the ratios 
or, equivalently, the differences of their preference values. 
 
From formula (2-3), it can be seen that not only the use of an additive formula is 
avoided in the multiplicative AHP, but also the negative effects of normalization can also be 
eliminated by using the multiplicative formula. These properties of the multiplicative AHP 
are demonstrated theoretically in [Triantaphyllou, 2000]. In that study, it was also proved that 
most of the ranking irregularities which occurred when the additive variants of the AHP 
method were used will not occur with the multiplicative AHP method.  
 
2.1.2 The ELECTRE Methods 
  
Another prominent role in MCDM methods is played by the ELECTRE approach and 
its derivatives. This approach was first introduced in [Benayoun, et al., 1966]. The main idea 
of this method is the proper utilization of what is called “outranking relations” to rank a set of 
alternatives. The ELECTRE approach uses the data within the decision problems along with 
some additional threshold values to measure the degree to which each alternative outranks all 
others. Soon after the introduction of the first version known as ELECTRE I [Roy, 1968], this 
approach has evolved into a number of other variants. Today two of the most widely used 
versions are known as ELECTRE II [Roy and Bertier, 1971, 1973] and ELECTRE III [Roy, 
1978]. Another variant of the ELECTRE approach is the TOPSIS method [Hwang and Yoon, 
1981]. Since the ELECTRE approach is more complicated than the AHP approach, a detailed 
description about the process of ELECTRE II and III methods is given in Chapter 4 by ways 
of two numerical examples.  
 
Compared with the simple process and precise data requirement of the AHP methods, 
ELECTRE methods are able to apply more complicated algorithms to deal with the complex 
and imprecise information from the decision problems and use these algorithms to rank the 
alternatives. The ELECTRE algorithms look reliable and in neat format. People believe that 
the process of this approach could lead to an explicit and logical ranking of the alternatives. 
However at it will be shown later, this may not always be the case.   
 
2.1.3 Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis 
  
In contrast to the above two approaches, multi-attribute utility analysis (MAUA) is 
another type of a systematic method for identifying and analyzing various alternatives and 
factors in order to arrive at a rational decision [Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Kirkwood, 1997].  
This MCDM approach transfers the performance value of an alternative under each decision 
criterion into a utility value according to a corresponding utility scale for that criterion and 
assigns a relative value for each criterion to stand for its importance (i.e., the weight of each 
criterion).  The utility is a numerical value between 0 and 1 and it represents the preferability 
of the alternative under that decision criterion.  Considering the importance of each criterion, 
the utility of each decision alternative under each criterion is multiplied by the weight of that 
criterion.  Then the total utility of each decision alternative could be calculated by summing 
up the weighted utility values under each decision criterion.  Next the alternatives are ranked 
in terms of their aggregated utilities.   
 
One of the key assumptions under the above utility model is that the decision makers 
(DMs) are “Rational Individuals” which devoid of psychological influences or emotions 
[Luce, 1992].  Under this assumption, it is expected that DMs will always want to make 
choices that can maximize the utilities of the chosen alternatives and the utilities of the 
alternatives are independent with each other. However, behavioral scientists have proved that 
it is not always appropriate to relate decision rationality to utility maximization. Examples 
demonstrating systematic violations of the independence and the utility maximization 
principle can be found in [Allais, 1988] and [Ellsberg, 1961].   
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2.2 Literature Review on Rank Reversals with the AHP Methods  
 
The AHP method has been widely used in many real-life decision problems. 
Thousands of AHP applications have been reported in edited volumes and books (e.g., 
Golden, et al., 1989, Saaty and Vargas, 2000) and on websites (e.g., www.expertchoice.com). 
However, many researchers have also criticized the AHP method for some of its problems. 
One such key problem is rank reversals. As mentioned previously, Belton and Gear in [1983] 
first reported the problem of rank reversals with the AHP. Their rank reversal example 
demonstrated that the ranking of alternatives might be altered by the addition (or deletion) of 
non-optimal alternatives (please refer to the rank reversal example in Section 2.1.1.2). This 
phenomenon inspired some doubts about the reliability and validity of the original AHP 
method. Soon after the first report, some other types of ranking irregularities with the original 
AHP method were also found. Dyer and Wendell in [1985] studied rank reversals when the 
AHP was used and near copies of some alternatives were considered in the decision problem. 
In [2000] Triantaphyllou reported another type of rank reversal with the additive AHP 
methods in which the indication of the optimal alternative may change when one of the non-
optimal alternatives is replaced by a worse one. Next in [2001] Triantaphyllou reported two 
new cases of ranking irregularities with the additive AHP methods. One is that the ranking of 
the alternatives may be different when all the alternatives are compared two at a time and also 
simultaneously. Another case is that the ranking of the alternatives may not follow the 
transitivity property when the alternatives are compared two at a time.  
 
Many researchers have also put a lot of effort in explaining the reasons behind the 
rank reversals and study how to avoid them. Belton and Gear in [1983] proposed the revised 
AHP method in order to preserve the ranking of the alternatives under the presence of 
identical alternatives. Saaty in [1987] pointed out that rank reversals were due to the inclusion 
of duplicates of the alternatives. Therefore he suggested that people should avoid the 
introduction of similar or identical alternatives. However, other cases were later found in 
which rank reversal occurred without the introduction of identical alternatives 
[Triantaphyllou, 2000]. Dyer in [1990a] indicated that the sum to unity normalization of 
priorities makes each one dependent on the set of alternatives being compared. He also 
claimed that the resulted individual priorities are thus arbitrary, as arbitrary sets of 
alternatives may be considered in the decision problem. Stam and Silva, in [1997] revealed 
that if the relative preference statements about alternatives were represented by judgment 
intervals (that is, the pairwise preference judgments are uncertain (stochastic)), rather than 
single values, then the rankings resulting from the traditional AHP analysis based on the 
single judgment values may be reversed and therefore are incorrect. Based on this statement, 
they developed some multivariate statistical techniques to obtain both point estimates and 
confidence intervals for the occurrence of certain types of rank reversal probabilities with the 


















3. Some Test Criteria for Evaluating MCDM Methods 
 
From the above chapter, it can be seen that most of the past research studies on 
examining the validity of ranking results from MCDM methods concentrated on the AHP 
method. There are very few studies that explore the reliability and validity of some other 
MCDM methods, like the widely used ELECTRE II and III methods. Does that mean 
decision makers can trust these methods without any questioning of the validity of their 
answers? The answer is absolutely “No”. Usually, decision makers undertake some kind of a 
sensitivity analysis to examine how the decision results will be affected by changes in some 
of the uncertain data in a decision problem. For example, is the ranking of the alternatives 
stable or easily changeable under different set of criteria weights? By this process, decision 
analysts may better understand a decision problem. It is not safe to accept an MCDM method 
as being accurate all the time.  
 
In [Triantaphyllou, 2000], three test criteria were established to evaluate the 
performance of MCDM methods by testing the validity of their ranking results. These test 
criteria are as follows:  
 
Test Criterion #1: 
An effective MCDM method should not change the indication of the best alternative when a 
non-optimal alternative is replaced by another worse alternative (given that the relative 
importance of each decision criterion remains unchanged).  
 
Suppose that an MCDM method has ranked a set of alternatives in some way. Next, 
suppose that a non-optimal alternative, say Ak, is replaced by another alternative, say Ak
/,
which is less desirable than Ak
 . Then, according to test criterion #1 the indication of the best 
alternative should not change when the alternatives are ranked again by the same method. The 
same should also be true for the relative rankings of the rest of the unchanged alternatives. 
 
Test Criterion #2: 
The rankings of alternatives by an effective MCDM method should follow the transitivity 
property. 
 
Suppose that an MCDM method has ranked a set of alternatives of a decision 
problem in some way. Next, suppose that this problem is decomposed into a set of smaller 
problems, each defined on two alternatives at a time and the same number of criteria as in the 
original problem. Then, according to this test criterion all the rankings which are derived from 
the smaller problems should satisfy the transitivity property. That is, if alternative A1 s better 
than alternative A2, and alternative A2 is better than alternative A3, then one should also expect 
that alternative A1 is better than alternative A3. 
 
The third test criterion is similar to the previous one but now one tests for the 
agreement between the smaller problems and the original un-decomposed problem. 
 
Test Criterion #3: 
For the same decision problem and when using the same MCDM method, after combining the 
rankings of the smaller problems that an MCDM problem is decomposed into, the new overall 
ranking of the alternatives should be identical to the original overall ranking of the un-
decomposed problem.  
 
As before, suppose that an MCDM problem is decomposed into a set of smaller 
problems, each defined on two alternatives and the original decision criteria. Next suppose 
that the rankings of the smaller problems follow the transitivity property. Then, according to 
this test criterion when the rankings of the smaller problems are all combined together, the 
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new overall ranking of the alternatives should be identical to the original overall ranking before 
the problem decomposition. 
 
In this research, these three test criteria were used to evaluate the performance of the 
ELECTRE II and the ELECTRE III methods. Both of them failed in terms of each one of 
these three test criteria. Next two rank reversal examples which occurred with the ELECTRE 
II and III methods under the first test criterion are demonstrated. The other two test criteria 











































4. Illustration of Rank Reversals with the ELECTRE II and 
III Methods 
 
For most ELECTRE methods, there are two main stages. These are the construction 
of the outranking relations and the exploitation of these relations to get the final ranking of 
the alternatives. Different ELECTRE methods may differ in how they define the outranking 
relations between the alternatives and how they apply these relations to get the final ranking 
of the alternatives. This is true with the ELECTRE II and III methods. However, the essential 
difference between these two methods is that they use different types of criteria. ELECTRE II 
uses the true criteria where no thresholds exist and the differences between criteria scores re 
used to determine which alternative is preferred. In this preference structure, the indifference 
relation is transitive [Rogers, et al., 1999]. The criteria used by ELECTRE III are pseudo-
criteria which involve the use of two-tiered thresholds. One is the indifference threshold q, 
below which the decision maker shows clear indifference, and the o r one is the preference 
threshold p, above which the decision maker is certain of strict preference [Rogers, et al., 
1999]. The situation between the above two is regarded as weak preference for alternative a 
over alternative b which indicates the decision maker’s hesitation between indifference and 
strict preference [Rogers, et al., 1999]. The following two rank reversal examples 
demonstrate how both of the two methods work and how the rank reversals may happen when 
using them to rank a set of decision alternatives.  
 
4.1 An Example of Rank Reversal with the ELECTRE II Method 
 
This example is based on a real-life case study where the ELECTRE II method was 
used to help find the best location for a wastewater treatment plant in Ireland [Rogers, et al., 
1999]. The decision problem is defined on 5 alternatives and 7 criteria. Note that here all the 
criteria are benefit criteria, that is, the higher the score the better the performance is. The 
decision matrix, that is, the performances of the alternatives Ai in terms of the criteria Cj, is as 
follows: 
 






  1     2     1     5     2     2     4 
  3     5     3     5     3     3     3 
  3     5     3     5     3     2     2 
  1     2     2     5     1     1     1 
  1     1     3     5     4     1     5 
 
The weights of the criteria are:  
 C1          C2          C3         C4          C5           C6                C7 
Weight 0.0780   0.1180   0.1570   0.3140   0.2350   0.0390   0.0590 
 
The ELECTRE methods are based on the evaluation of two indices, the concordance 
index and the discordance index, defined for each pair of alternatives. The concordance index 
for a pair of alternatives a and b measures the strength of the hypothesis that alternative a is at 
least as good as alternative b. The discordance index measures the strength of evidence 
against this hypothesis [Belton and Stewart, 2001]. There are no unique measures of 
concordance and discordance indices. In ELECTRE II, the concordance index C(a, b) for 
each pair of alternatives (a, b) is defined as follows: 
                                           ( , )
1
( , ) .











                                                (4-1) 
Where Q (a, b) is the set of criteria for which a is equal or preferred to (i.e., at least as good 
as) b, and wi is the weight of the i-th criterion. For instance, the concordance indices for this 
example are as follows: 
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1.0000    0.3730    0.4120    0.8430    0.5490 
0.9410    1.0000    1.0000    1.0000    0.7060 
0.9410    0.9020    1.0000    1.0000    0.7060 
0.6670    0.3140    0.3140    1.0000    0.5490 
0.8430    0.7650    0.7650    0.8820    1.0000 
 
The discordance index D (a, b) for each pair of alternatives (a, b) is defined as 
follows: 
                                  
max[ ( ) ( )]
( , ) .
i i
i




=                                           (4-2) 
Where ( )ig a represents the performance of alternative a in terms of criterion Ci, 
( )ig b represents the performance of alternative b in terms of criterion Ci, and 
max | ( ) ( ) |i i
i
g b g aδ = −  (i.e., the maximum difference on any criterion). This formula can 
only be used when the scores for different criteria are comparable. When the above formula is 




After computing the concordance and discordance indices for each pair of 
alternatives, two types of outranking relations are built by comparing these indices with two 
pairs of threshold values: (C*, D*) and (C —,D —). The pair (C*, D*) is defined as the 
concordance and discordance thresholds for the strong outranking relation and the pair (C —, 
D —) is defined as the thresholds for the w ak outranking relation where C*> C — and D*< D —
. Next the outranking relations are built according to the following two rules: 
(1) If C(a, b) ≥ C*, D(a, b) ≤ D* and C(a, b) ≥ C(b, a), then alternative a is regarded 
as strongly outranking alternative b. 
(2) If C(a, b) ≥  C —, D(a, b) ≤  D — and C(a, b) ≥ C(b, a), then alternative a is 
regarded as weakly outranking alternative b.  
The values of (C*, D*) and (C —, D —) are decided by the decision makers for a particular 
outranking relation. They may be varied to yield more or less severe outranking relations. The 
higher the value of C*and the lower the value of D*, the more severe the outranking relation 
becomes. That is, the more difficult it is for one alternative to outrank another [Belton and 
Stewart, 2001].  
 
For this example, two pairs of thresholds for the strong outranking relation and one 





*=0.25; and C —=0.65, D —=0.25. According to the above rules and the 
three pairs of thresholds, the outranking relations for this example were derived to be as 
follows: 






—                     SF 
SF    —     SF     SF      
SF           —      SF      
                        — 
SF                    SF    —  
 
In the above notation SF stands for the strong outranking relation. For example, A1 S
F A4 
means that alternative A1 strongly outranks alternative A4. We use S
f (i.e., the superscript now 






0.0000   0.7500   0.7500   0.2500   0.5000 
0.2500   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.5000 
0.5000   0.2500   0.0000   0.0000   0.7500 
0.7500   0.7500   0.7500   0.0000   1.0000 
0.2500   1.0000   1.0000   0.2500   0.0000 
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is low case “f”; not present on the above table) to stand for the weak outranking relation. The 
weak outranking relation would happen later in this example.  
 
On the basis of the outranking relations, next the descending and ascending 
distillation processes are applied to obtain two complete pre-orders of the alternatives. The 
details of the distillation processes can be found in [Belton and Stewart, 2001] and [Rogers, et 
al., 1999]. The descending pre-order is built up by starting with the set of “best” alternatives 
(those which outrank other alternatives) and going downward to the worse one. On the 
contrary, the ascending pre-order is built up by starting with the set of “worst” alternatives 
(those which are outranked by other alternatives) and going upward to the best one. The 
distillation results for this example are as follows: the pre-order from the descending 
distillation is A2= A5> A3> A1> A4; the pre-order from the ascending distillation is A2>A5= 
A3> A1> A4.  
 
The last step is to combine the two complete pre-orders to get either a partial or a 
complete final pre-order. Whether the final product is a partial pre-order (not containing a 
relative ranking of all of the alternatives) rather than a complete pre-order depends on the 
level of consistency between the rankings from the two distillation procedures [Rogers, et al., 
1999]. The partial pre-order allows two alternatives to remain incomparable without affecting 
the validity of the overall ranking, which differentiates from the complete pre-order. A 
commonly used method for determining the final pre-order is to take the intersection of the 
descending and ascending pre-orders. The intersection of the two pre-orders is defined such 
that alternative a outranks alternative b if and only if a outranks or is in the same class as b 
according to the two pre-orders. If alternative a is preferred to alternative b in one pre-order 
but b is preferred to a in the other one, then the two alternatives are incomparable in the final 
pre-order [Rogers, et al., 1999]. By following the above rules, the intersection of the two pre-
orders for this example resulted in the following complete pre-order of the alternatives: 
A2>A5> A3> A1> A4 and obviously A2 is the optimal alternative at this point.  
 
Next, alternative A3 was randomly selected to be replaced by a worse one, say A3
/, in 
order to test the stability of the ranking of the alternatives under the first test criterion. The 
new decision matrix now is as follows: 
 








1     2     1     5     2     2     4 
3     5     3     5     3     3     3 
2     4     2     4     2     1     1 
1     2     2     5     1     1     1 
1     1     3     5     4     1     5 
 
Please note that alternative A3 is replaced by a less desirable one denoted as A3
/ which is 
determined by subtracting the value 1 from the performance values of the original alternative 
A3 (the subtracted value was selected randomly by a computer program to make sure it will 
cause the chosen alternative to become worse than the one it replaces). 
 
The rest of the data are kept the same as before. The intermediate results during the 
ranking process are as follows: 
 
The concordance indices are: 
     A1            A2           A3








—        0.3730    0.6470    0.8430    0.5490 
0.9410        —        1.0000    1.0000    0.7060 
0.5880         0          —          0.6860    0.2350 
0.6670    0.3140    0.5690        —      0.5490 
0.8430    0.7650    0.8040    0.8820        —
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The discordance indices are: 
      A1          A2            A3








—        0.7500    0.5000     0.2500    0.5000 
0.2500         —         0            0             0.5000 
0.7500    0.5000      —           0.2500    1.0000 
0.7500    0.7500    0.5000         —      1.0000 
0.2500    1.0000    0.7500     0.2500         — 
 
The outranking relations are: 
 A1    A2    A3








—                     SF 
SF    —     SF     SF      
                 —      Sf      
                        — 
SF                    SF    —  
where Sf (in location (3, 4)) stands for the weak outranking relation. 
 
When the descending and ascending distillation processes are applied again, the 
descending pre-order now is A2= A5> A3= A1> A4 while the ascending pre-order is 
A2=A5>A3= A1> A4. After combining the two pre-orders together, a new complete pre-order is 
got as follows: A2=A5>A3= A1> A4. Now the best ranked alternatives are A2 and A5 together, a 
contradiction from the previous result which had A2 as the only optimal alternative. 
 
4.2 An Example of Rank Reversal with the ELECTRE III Method 
 
This illustrative example is also based on a real-life decision problem which was 
defined on 11 alternatives and 11 decision criteria. The goal of this case is to choose the best 
waste incineration strategy for the eastern Switzerland region [Rogers, et al., 1999]. In this 
example, the first test criterion reveals a case of rank reversal when the ELECTRE III method 
is used. The main data are as follows: 
      












125  866    9.81 218  1.41 542  483     23 1.5   1 1 
11,980   900    11.45 189  1.45 452   303     12  1.5    6 6 
31,054   883    9.86 172  1.82  341        311  0  0    3    3 
28,219   840    10.38  171   1.95  339   318  0  0    3  3 
31,579   903    10.74  165   1.7  312   281  0  0    5    5 
39,364   922    13.87  167   1.65  287   269  0  0    8   7 
125  769    9.33  182   1.64  458   180  0  1.5    1  1 
8,075   896    9.82  172   1.7  408   121  0  1.5    6    6 
3,089   770    9.39  177        1.9  430        228  0  1    2  2 
6,449   766    7.22  172   1.65  401        157  0  1    4   4 
12,074   897    10.61  169   1.65  378   162  0  1    7  6 
 
Please note that in this example, criteria C2, C6 and C7 are benefit criteria, which means the 
higher the score of a given criterion is, the more preferable it is. The other criteria are cost 
criteria, which means the lower the score of a given criterion is, the more preferable it is. 
 
The weights W, the indifference thresholds Q and the preference thresholds P of the 
criteria are as follows: 




0.16    0.033   0.033   0.097  0.097   0.16   0.097  0.16  0.033  0.033  0.097 
± 1,000  10%     10%     ± 5     10%    10%   10%   ± 2    0.2      ± 0     ± 0 
± 2,000  20%     20%     ± 10   20%    20%   20%   ± 4    0.4      ± 1     ± 1 
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*Please note that in this example, no veto threshold is specified as it is the case in the above 
cited paper. 
 
Next the concordance index Ci (a, b) calculated for each pair of alternatives (a, b) in 
terms of each one of the decision criteria according to the following formula: 
                   
1, ( ) ( ( )) ( )
( , )
0, ( ) ( ( )) ( )
i i i i
i
i i i i
if z a q z a z b
C a b
if z a p z a z b
        +  ≥
=          +  ≤
                                      (4-3) 
or by linear interpolation between 0 and 1 when zi (a)+qi (zi (a))<zi (b)<zi(a)+pi (zi (a)), where 
qi (.) and pi (.) are the indifference and preference threshold values for criterion Ci [Belton and 
Stewart, 2001]. For instance, the concordance indices in terms of the first decision criterion, 
which is C1 (a, b), are as follows: 












  —     1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 
0.00     —     1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   1.00 
0.00   0.00    —      0.00   1.00   1.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
0.00   0.00   1.00     —     1.00   1.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
0.00   0.00   1.00   0.00     —    1.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00     —   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00     —  1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 
0.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   0.00     — 0.00   0.37   1.00 
0.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   0.00   1.00     — 1.00   1.00 
0.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   0.00   1.00   0.00     —  1.00 
0.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00    — 
 
The next step is to calculate the discordance index Di (a, b) for all the alternatives in 
terms of each one of the decision criteria according to the following formula: 
                
0, ( ) ( ) ( ( ))
( , )
1, ( ) ( ) ( ( ))
i i i i
i
i i i i
if z b z a p z a
D a b
if z b z a t z a
        ≤ +  
=          ≥ +  
                                         (4-4) 
or by linear interpolation between 0 and 1 when zi (a)+pi (zi (a))<zi (b)<zi(a)+ti (zi (a)), where 
ti (.) is the veto threshold for criterion Ci [Belton and Stewart, 2001]. If no veto threshold is 
specified, then Di (a, b)=0 for all pairs of alternatives. For instance, in this example, since no 
veto thresholds are specified, the discordance indices in terms of each decision criterion are 
all equal to zero. 
 
The next step is to calculate the overall concordance index C (a, b) of all the 
alternatives by applying the following formula: 
                                    1
1
( , )












                                                     (4-5) 
Finally, the credibility matrix S (a, b) of all the alternatives is calculated by applying the 
following formula: 
          
( , )
( , ),   ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ,(1 ( , ))
( , )
(1 ( , ))
i
i
i J a b i
C a b if D a b C a b i
S a b D a b






                
,  
                (4-6) 
where J (a, b) is the set of criteria for which Di (a, b)>C (a, b). The credibility matrix is a 
measure of the strength of the claim that “alternative a is at least as good as alternative b”. For 
this case, the credibility matrix is equal to the concordance matrix since no veto thresholds are 
assigned so the discordance matrices are all zero matrices, which results to S (a, b) = C (a, b) 
and both are as follow in next page.  
 
Next the descending and ascending distillations [Belton and Stewart, 2001; Rogers, et 
al., 1999] based on the credibility matrix are applied to construct two pre-orders for the 
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alternatives. The pre-order obtained from the descending distillation is as follows: A9> A4> 
A7> A10> A3= A5= A8= A11> A1> A2> A6. The pre-order obtained from the ascending 
distillation is as follows: A1= A7> A9> A4> A10> A2= A5> A3= A11> A8> A6. Then the two pre-
orders are combined to get the final overall ranking of the alternatives as shown in Figure 1. 
 












0.00   0.74   0.71   0.71   0.71   0.71   0.74   0.74   0.71   0.68   0.71 
0.44   0.00   0.57   0.58   0.58   0.71   0.48   0.57   0.39   0.39   0.71 
0.36   0.58   0.00   0.84   0.96   1.00   0.55   0.69   0.55   0.69   0.83 
0.36   0.58   1.00   0.00   0.95   0.95   0.49   0.65   0.55   0.62   0.76 
0.38   0.63   0.86   0.68   0.00   1.00   0.54   0.68   0.54   0.52   0.68 
0.38   0.48   0.48   0.47   0.68   0.00   0.52   0.52   0.52   0.52   0.52 
0.72   0.86   0.76   0.77   0.75   0.74   0.00   0.88   0.87   0.84   0.85 
0.38   0.84   0.74   0.74   0.70   0.87   0.58   0.00   0.58   0.61   0.87 
0.35   0.78   0.85   0.85   0.74   0.73   0.67   0.97   0.00   0.94   0.89 
0.40   0.81   0.72   0.74   0.81   0.84   0.60   0.98   0.61   0.00   0.98 
0.41   0.70   0.74   0.74   0.74   0.87   0.53   0.81   0.55   0.68   0.00 
 
The way to combine the two pre-orders is the same as that of ELECTRE II, which has 
been described in the first example. The arrow line in Figure 1 means ‘outrank’. For example, 
A9 outranks A4. Two alternatives are incomparable if there is no direct or indirect arrow line 
to link them together. For example, A7 and A9 are incomparable. Alternatives are indifferent if 
they are at the same level. For example, A3 and A11 are indifferent with each other. It can be 
seen now that A7 and A9 are both located at the top level and they are incomparable with each 
other. Incomparability may be caused by the lack of the criterion information of the 
alternatives. This means that there is no clear evidence in favor of either A7 or A9. In real-life 
applications of ELECTRE II and III methods, the decision analysts will need to find more 
information about such alternatives and do a further study to decide which one is the best one. 
However, for the simplicity of the current test, A7 and A9 are both regarded as the best-ranked 
alternatives because both of them are ranked first in the final partial pre-order. As a result, the 
rest of the alternatives were regarded as the non-optimal ones.  
 
Next, according to the first test criterion, we randomly selected one of the non-
optimum alternatives; say alternative A1 to be replaced by a worse one A1
/ to test the 
reliability of the alternatives’ ranking. Since the performance value of A1 in terms of each 
criterion was [125  866  9.81  218  1.41  542  483  23  1.5  1  1], we subtracted [-2,000  0  0  0  
0  90  0  0  0  0  0] (the subtracted value was selected randomly by a computer program to 
make sure it will make the chosen alternative to become worse than before) from A1 t  get A1
/ 
which is less desirable than A1. Please recall that the first criterion is a cost criterion which 
means the bigger a score the less desirable it is. The performance values of A1
/ are [2,125  866  
9.81  218  1.41  452 483  23  1.5  1 1]. The new decision matrix with the aij values of the 
alternatives (after alternative A1 is replaced by A1
/) is as follows: 
 













2,125  866   9.81 218  1.41 452  483     23 1.5   1 1 
11,980   900  11.45 189  1.45 452   303     12  1.5    6 6 
31,054   883        9.86 172  1.82  341        311  0  0    3    3 
28,219   840   10.38  171   1.95  339   318  0  0    3  3 
31,579   903   10.74  165   1.7  312   281  0  0    5    5 
39,364   922   13.87  167   1.65  287   269  0  0    8   7 
125  769        9.33  182   1.64  458   180  0  1.5    1         1 
8,075   896    9.82  172   1.7  408   121  0  1.5    6    6 
3,089   770        9.39  177        1.9  430        228  0  1    2  2 
6,449   766    7.22  172   1.65  401        157  0  1    4   4 
12,074   897        10.61  169   1.65  378   162  0  1    7  6 
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The rest of the data are kept the same. When the previous steps are applied on the 
modified problem again, we get that the descending pre-order is A7> A9> A4> A10> A3 = A5 = 
A8= A11> A1> A2> A6 and the ascending pre-order is A7> A1=A9> A4> A10> A2= A5> A3= A11> 
A8> A6. The overall ranking of the alternatives is as shown in Figure 2. This time it turns out 
that the best-ranked alternative now is only A7 which is different from the original conclusion 
which had A7 and A9 as the best-ranked alternatives.  












   Figure 1. Ranking for the original example.       Figure 2. Ranking for the changed example. 
 
Why did the above contradictions occur? When A1 was replaced by a worse one, it is 
reasonable to assume that some alternatives which originally are ranked lower than A1 m y
become more preferable than it. However, there is no legitimate reason why the optimal 
alternative should also be changed and why the original incomparable relation between two 






















5. Analysis of the Rank Reversals with the ELECTRE II and 
III Methods 
 
After analyzing the ranking processes of the ELECTRE II and III methods and some 
rank reversal cases which occurred when these methods were used, it was found that the main 
reason for the above rank reversals lies in the exploitation of the pairwise outranking 
relations. That is, the upward and downward distillation processes of ELECTRE II and 
ELECTRE III. The basic idea behind the distillation processes is to decide the rank of each 
alternative by the degree of how this alternative outranks all the other alternatives. When a 
non-optimal alternative in an alternative set is replaced by a worse one, the pairwise 
outranking relations related to it may be changed accordingly and the overall ranking of the 
whole alternative set, which depends on those pairwise outranking relations, may also be 
changed. The first change is reasonable when considering the fact that a non-optimal 
alternative has been replaced by a worse one. However, the second change is unreasonable 
and may cause undesirable rank reversals as in the examples presented in Chapter 3.  
 
As it is demonstrated in the next chapter, where one decomposes a decision problem 
into smaller problems and analyzes them by using the ELECTRE II or III method, the 
rankings of the smaller problems may not follow the transitivity property. This fact along with 
the above rank reversal examples reveals that there is not an priori ranking of the alternatives 
when they are ranked by the ELECTRE II or III methods because the ranking of an individual 
alternative derived by these methods depends on the performance of all the other alternatives 
currently under consideration. This causes the ranking of the alternatives to depend on each 
other. Thus, it is likely that the optimal alternative may be different and the ranking of the 
alternatives may be distorted to some extent if one of the non-optimal alternatives in the 
alternative set is replaced by a worse one. 
 
This can be further explained by means of a simple example. Giv n three alternatives: 
A1, A2, and A3, suppose that originally A1 strongly outranks A3, A2 weakly outranks A3 and A1 
and A2 are indifferent with each other. The ranking of these three alternatives will be A1 > A2 
> A3 when using the ELECTRE II method. Next, if the non-optimal alternative A3 is replaced 
by a worse one, then A2 may strongly outrank A3 while A1 is still strongly outranking A3 and 
A1 is still indifferent with A2. Nothing is wrong so far. But now the ranking of the three 
alternatives will be A1= A2> A3 by using the same method since both A1 and A2 now strongly 
outrank A3 and they are indifferent with each other. It can be seen that A1 and A2 are ranked 
equally now because A3 becomes less desirable. This is exactly what happened in the first 
example: A2 and A5 are ranked equally after A3 has been replaced by a less desirable 
alternative. This kind of irregular situation is undesirable for a practical decision-making 
problem though it is reasonable in terms of the logic of the ELECTRE II method. It could 
leave the ranking of a set of alternatives to be manipulated to some extent.   
 
The ranking irregularity in the above example is very likely to occur when using the 
ELECTRE II or III method to rank a set of alternatives. If the number of alternatives of a 
decision problem is more than 3, there will be more than C3
2 (=6) pairwise outranking 
relations between them. Then the situation may become worse by totally changing the 
indication of the best ranked alternative. It was once pointed out in [Belton and Stewart, 
2001] that the results of the distillations are dependent on the whole alternative set, so that the 
addition or removal of an alternative may alter some of the preferences between the 
remaining alternatives. A similar situation occurs with the PROMETHEE method which is 
another variant of the outranking method. In [Keyser and Peeters, 1996], it was pointed out 
that the complete pre-orders from the PROMETHEE method are based on an all-to-all 
comparison between the alternatives; adding or deleting an alternative can put the previous 
pre-orders upside down. From the study reported in this thesis, now it can be seen that a 
similar situation also occurs with the ELECTRE II and III methods. That is, even without the 
addition or removal of alternatives, the best ranked alternative might be altered and the 
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previous pre-order between the remaining alternatives might be changed to some degree by 
just replacing a non-optimal alternative by a worse one.  
 
It must be pointed out here that there is another factor that may contribute to rank 
reversals. During the construction of the pairwise outranking relations, both ELECTRE II and 
III need to use a value or a threshold which is also dependent on the performance values of all 
the currently considered alternatives. For ELECTRE II, it is the parameter δ (i.e., the 
maximum difference of any criterion) in the discordance index formula. For ELECTRE III, it 
is the parameterλ used to decide the preferenceλ −  relations between the alternatives during 
the distillations. These δ and λ values may be altered when a non-optimal alternative is 
replaced by a worse one. Then the previous outranking relations between the other unchanged 
alternatives may be distorted to some degree, which finally may alter the indication of the 
best ranked alternative or the overall ranking of the alternatives. According to some 
experimental analysis, the above two factors may function together or separately to cause 
rank reversals. 
 
From the above analysis, it can be seen that the ranking processes of the ELECTRE II 
and III are not reliable and robust enough to offer a firm answer to a decision problem. 
Usually, decision makers undertake some kind of sensitivity analysis to appreciate the 
sensitivity of the final rankings and the robustness of the ranking procedures to changes in the 
criteria weights and thresholds when they use ELECTRE methods to solve decision problems. 
However, the above ranking irregularities can warn decision analysts that they should be 
cautious in accepting the ranking recommendations of the ELECTRE methods even after a 
































6. An Empirical Study 
 
This chapter describes an empirical study that focused on how often these ranking 
irregularities may happen under the ELECTRE II and III methods. Some computer programs 
were written in MATLAB in order to generate simulated decision problems and test the 
performance of ELECTRE II and III under the three test criteria described in Chapter 3. In 
these test problems, the number of the alternatives was equal to the following ten different 
values: 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, and 21. However, there is not a common range of the 
criteria for all the tests. Compared with the tests of ELECTRE II, a wider range of criteria for 
the tests of ELECTRE III was needed in these experiments in order to clearly show how the 
ranking irregularity rates under ELECTRE III will fluctuate with the increase on the number 
of the criteria. For the three tests of ELECTRE II, the number of criteria was equal to 3, 5, 7, 
9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, and 31. Thus, a total of 150 different cases were 
examined with 10,000 randomly generated decision problems (in order to derive statistically 
significant results) per case. For the three tests of ELECTRE III, the number of criteria was 
equal to the odd numbers between 3 and 61. Thus, a total of 300 different cases were 
examined with 10,000 random decision problems per case. Each random decision problem 
was analyzed first by using the ELECTRE II or III method and then was analyzed again by 
using the same method after one of the non-optimal alternatives was replaced by a worse one 
or the whole decision problem was decomposed into smaller problems as described in the last 
two test criteria. Any occurred ranking irregularity was recorded. Figures 3 to 8 summarize 
these test results. In these figures, different curves correspond to cases with different numbers 
of alternatives; the X axis stands for the number of criteria and the Y axis is the rate of 
ranking irregularities that occurred in the 10,000 simulated decision problems.  
 
Figures 3 and 4 describe how often rank reversal happened with the ELECTRE II and 
III methods under test criterion #1 in this empirical study. That is, how often the indication of 
the best alternative is changed when a non-optimal alternative is replaced by another worse 
alternative (given that the relative importance of each decision criterion remains unchanged). 
The basis of any ELECTRE method is to decide the pairwise outranking relations between the 
alternatives. Given n alternatives, when a non-optimal alternative was replaced by a worse 
one, the number of pairwise outranking relations that might be changed is at most (n-1). This 
indicates that the higher the number of the alternatives is the more possible becomes that the 
variation of a single alternative may have a noticeable influence on the outranking relations. It 
is the change of the outranking relations that results in the rank reversals. This is why the rank 
reversal rates usually increase with the increase on the number of alternatives.  
 
It should be clarified here that even if a case passed test criterion #1, this does not 
mean that this case is immune to the rank reversal situation described in test criterion #1. 
When applying test criterion #1, one non-optimal alternative needs to be picked up and 
replaced by a worse one. Which non-optimal alternative will be selected and how worse it 
could be to trigger the rank reversal to happen were all randomly chosen by the program. 
When replacing a non-optimal alternative by a worse one, the program only makes the 
selected non-optimal alternative to be worse than before to a certain degree to test if the 
change is enough to trigger a rank reversal to occur. If no rank reversal happens, the case will 
be released and marked as having passed test criterion #1. It is not possible to test all the 
possibilities in terms of a given single case. Therefore, even if a case passed test criterion #1 
in a single experiment, this does not mean that it is immune to the type one rank reversal.  
 
Figures 5 and 6 depict how the ranking irregularity rates of ELECTRE II and III 
varied with the increase on the number of alternatives and the number of criteria in terms of 
test criterion #2. One can see from these figures that the rates generally increase with the 
increase on the number of the alternatives. This happens because the higher the number of 
alternatives is, the higher is the number of smaller problems that a decision problem was 
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decomposed into, and then the more likely it is for a contradiction between the smaller 
problems to happen. 
 
In order to apply test criterion #3, 10,000 random decision problems whose rankings 
follow the transitivity property by using the ELECTRE II or III method must be generated 
and then be examined under test criterion #3. However, as one can see from Figures 5 and 6, 
when the number of alternative is up to 7 or 9, the rankings of the random decision problems 
almost never follow the transitivity property when the number of criteria is in some range. It 
is difficult to find 10,000 random decision problems per case that can be used in the third 
series of tests. Thus, only the cases where the number of alternatives was equal to 3, 5 or 7 
were tested. Figures 7 and 8 show how often the ranking irregularity will happen to these 
cases under test criterion #3. The reason why this rate increases with the number of 
alternatives is the same as that of the experiments under test criterion #2.  
 
What is the relationship between these ranking irregularity rates with the number of 
the decision criteria? From these figures one can see that, in general, the ranking irregularity 
rates will first increase with an increase on the number of the criteria but then decrease when 
the number of criteria increases beyond a certain value for each case. The reason for this 
tendency can be explained as follows. First, please recall that the pairwise outranking 
relations between each pair of alternatives are decided by the concordance and discordance 
indices which are computed by using their performance values under each criterion. For a 
fixed number of alternatives, if the number of criteria is increased to a certain large value, the 
pairwise outranking relations between the alternatives and the subsequent ranking of the 
alternatives will tend to become more stable than before. 
  
A different type of experiments was run as well. The goal now was to examine if 
there are any explicit connections between the results under the three test criteria, especially 
between test criterion #1 and test criterion #2. The experimental tests were executed as 
follows. First, a large number (i.e., 10,000) of randomly generated decision problems were 
examined by using the ELECTRE II or III method in terms of test criterion #1 and the random 
test problems were divided into two groups. One group had the problems that passed test 
criterion #1 and the other group had those that did not pass test criterion #1. Next, the 
problems within each of these two groups were examined in terms of the test criterion #2 and 
the rates of how often they passed or failed to pass this test criterion were recorded and 
plotted for each one of the two groups.  
 
Next, a test process similar to the above one was performed. Again, a large number of 
randomly generated decision problems were examined by using the ELECTRE II or III 
method but now the process started by first testing for behavior under the test criterion #2. 
The problems were divided into two groups indicating passing or not passing this test 
criterion. Then the problems within each one of these two groups were examined in terms of 
the test criterion #1 and the rates of how often they will pass or fail to pass this test criterion 
are recorded and plotted as before for each one of these two groups. Similar tests as the above 
ones were also performed between test criterion #1 and test criterion #3. From the above 
experimental test results, no clear tendency was found to indicate that failure in one test 
criterion would have a tendency to lead to failure in terms of another test criterion. That is, 
not any explicit connection between the results under the three different test criteria was 
found from these types of experiments. 
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Figure 3. Rank Reversal Rates of ELECTRE II under Test Criterion #1.  



















































Figure 4. Rank Reversal Rates of ELECTRE III under Test Criterion #1. 
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Figure 5. Ranking Irregularity Rates of ELECTRE II under Test Criterion #2. 



























































Figure 6. Ranking Irregularity Rates of ELECTRE III under Test Criterion #2. 
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Figure 7. Ranking Irregularity Rates of ELECTRE II under Test Criterion #3. 



























































7. Some Real-life Case Studies 
 
The previous computational results revealed that the ranking irregularities studied in 
this research may occur frequently in simulated decision problems. This raised the question 
whether the same could also be true with real-life decision problems. In order to enhance our 
understanding of this situation, ten real-life cases were studied. These cases were selected 
randomly from the published literature. That is, no special screening was performed. The only 
requirement was to be able to extract the numerical data needed to form a decision matrix and 
the weights of the criteria. It is better if threshold values could be given in the published case 
to avoid the inconvenience with the using of the newly defined thresholds. In these 
experiments, the required thresholds for case 1 to case 8 have been specified in the referenced 
publications. For the last two cases, the thresholds were specified appropriately according to 
the score range of each criterion. After getting the data, every case was tested by using the 
ELECTRE II or III method as in the referenced publication. Then the three types of ranking 
irregularities were recorded whenever they occurred. Please refer to Table I for the summary 
of the experimental results. Actually, the two examples presented in Chapter 4 are among 
these 10 tested cases. 
 
Under test criterion #1, that is, when replacing one of the non-optimal alternatives by 
a worse one, there are mainly two types of rank reversal situations:  
 
1. The optimal alternatives of the changed decision problem are partially different 
from that of the original problem. The number of the optimal alternatives of the 
changed problem is more or less than that of the original problem. For example, in 
terms of case 7, originally the optimal alternative is A8. Next the optimal 
alternatives may become A7 and A8 under test criterion #1; for case 2, originally the 
optimal alternatives are A6 and A3, and then it may be just A6 after one of the non-
optimal alternatives was replaced by a worse one. 
 
2.  The optimal alternative of the new problem is totally different from that of the 
original problem. For example, for case 8, originally the optimal alternative is A9,
and then it becomes A7 when one of the non-optimal alternatives was replaced by a 
worse one; for case 6, originally the optimal alternative is A4, it may become A10 
and A18 under the first test criterion #1. 
 
In terms of the same case, the above two situations might both happen or just one of 
them happened in the tests. The emphasis is that the indication of the best alternative had been 
changed for those cases if any of the two situations occurred to them. Then one can conclude 
that rank reversals occurred to those cases and they failed to pass test criterion #1. From Table 
I, it can be seen that 6 out 10 cases failed to pass test criterion #1. Also, 9 out 10 cases failed 
to pass test criterion #2. For the only case which could be tested under test criterion #3, it 


















Reference Domain of application and method 
used 
Size of decision problem Did it fail 
T. C. #1? 
Did it fail 
T. C. #2? 
Did it fail 




1 Hokkanen, J., and P. 
Salminen, [1997a] 
Choosing a solid waste management 
system (ELECTRE III) 
22 8 Yes Yes — 
2 Belton, V., and T.J. Stewart, 
[2001] 
Business location problem  
(ELECTRE III) 
7 6 No Yes — 
3 Rogers, M., and M. Bruen, 
[1996] 
Environmental appraisal  
(ELECTRE II) 
9 9 No No Yes 
4 Rogers, M.G., M. Bruen, and 
L.-Y. Maystre, [1999] 
Site selection for a wastewater 
treatment plant (ELECTRE II) 
5 7 Yes Yes — 
5 Raj, P.A., [1995] Water resources planning (ELECTRE 
II) 
27 6 Yes Yes — 
6 Buchanan, J., P. Sheppard, 
and D.V. Lamsade, [1999] 
Project ranking (ELECTRE III) 5 5 No Yes — 
7 Hokkanen, J., and P. 
Salminen, [1997b] 
Choosing a solid waste management 
system (ELECTRE III) 
11 8 Yes  Yes — 
8 Rogers, M.G., M. Bruen, and 
L.-Y. Maystre, [1999]  
Choosing a waste incineration 
strategy (ELECTRE III) 
11    11 Yes  Yes — 
9 Poh, K.L., and B.W. Ang, 
[1999] 
Choosing an alternative fuel system 
for land transportation (ELECTRE II) 
4 6 No Yes — 
10 Leyva-López, J.C., and E. 
Fernández-González, [2003] 
Selection of an alternative electricity 
power plant (ELECTRE III) 
6 6 Yes Yes — 
 
* “T. C.” stands for “Test Criterion”. 
* If a case failed under test criterion #2, it will not be able to get an overall ranking of the alternatives from the smaller problems. That means it will 








8. Some Ongoing Research on Regret and Rejoicing 
 
Usually the problem of rank reversal is undesirable in decision-making. If a method 
does allow it to happen, the validity of the method should be questioned, like the ELECTRE 
II and III method and the AHP method. However, some recent studies showed that it is not 
always unreasonable to have such rank reversals happening with MCDM problems 
[Kujawski, 2005]. The critical question is to be able to distinguish why it happens. When a 
method exhibits rank reversals, is it because it accurately captured the way rational humans 
deal with decision making and their preferences’ change or is it because the method has some 
kind of numerical instabilities/defects?  Let us put it more clearly through a metaphor: 
suppose a method is like a photo camera or X-ray image taking machine.  One takes a photo 
or takes an X-ray image of the body and sees something strange in that image, like some very 
bright spots.  Do these bright spots exist in reality or are the result of some kind of hardware 
defects?   
 
For different MCDM methods and decision models, the answer to the above question 
could be very different.  As it was discussed above, the reasons for the rank reversal problems 
with ELECTRE II and III methods and the additive AHP method lie in these methods’ own 
mathematical instabilities/defects. However, rank reversals could also happen because people 
may reverse their preference due to their emotional feelings, like regret and rejoicing. Next 
this point is illustrated by some vivid examples.  
 
8.1 The Influence of Regret and Rejoicing on MCDM Problems 
 
First, let us see how rejoicing may play a vital role in real-life decision making 
process. Suppose one is planning to buy a new car and a dealer offers two cars, say car A1 
and car A2. In this hypothetical scenario car A1 is cheaper than car A2 but car A2 is of better 
quality than car A1. Then, one may decide to buy car A1 because it is cheaper. Next, suppose 
that besides the above two cars, the dealer introduces a third car A3 (let us call it a phantom 
alternative) which may not even be at stock at that dealership but it has been publicized by the 
media. This third car A3 is much more expensive than the previous two cars but it is of 
slightly better quality than car A2. Knowing this situation about the third car, the perspective 
buyer may shift his/her preference and now choose car A2 instead of car A1 without actually 
changing anything regarding the two cars and the importance of the two evaluation criteria: 
cost and quality. This may happen because when comparing car A2 with car A3, the buyer 
feels very happy for getting a great deal by paying much less money to buy an almost equal 
quality car A2. Thus for this example, it is this rejoicing feeling that makes one 
unintentionally to reverse his/her preference between cars A1 and A2.   
 
Except rejoicing, another type of emotional feeling which can greatly influence 
people’s preference in decision-making is regret. This type of emotional feeling comes from 
the fact that humans often base their choices on comparisons across the alternatives under 
consideration and relative to “what might have been” under another choice [Plous, 1993; 
Hastie and Dawes, 2001]. For example, given are two alternatives A1 and A2 which have been 
evaluated in terms of three criteria. Assume that by using one MCDM method, the overall 
performance value of A1 is better than that of A2 but the individual performance value a1k of 
alternative A1 under some criterion Ck is worse than that of alternative A2. Then the decision 
maker (DM) who chooses A1 and forgoes A2 may experience a certain level of regret because 
the criterion value a1k is worse than a2k. This regret feeling could be so strong that he/she may 
regret to have chosen A1 instead of A2.  In order to avoid the above situation, the decision 
maker would want to anticipate the regret feeling and consider it in the decision-making 
process by making some tradeoffs for a more balanced alternative. 
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From the above examples, it can be seen that making a choice/decision, no matter 
what kind of, can be an intensive emotional experience. When making decisions, except those 
cognitive considerations about the decision problems themselves, sometimes people also need 
to consider some intense emotional factors, like regret and rejoicing. Psychologically 
speaking humans often behave based on a combination of reasons and emotions. Thus it is 
natural that decisions could be made by the mind and also by the heart instead of by a 
complete rational mind which is dissociated from psychological feelings. Meanwhile, the 
above car example indicates that consideration of regret and rejoicing might be able to offer 
decision makers the flexibility to change their preferences and choices in a rational way. Thus, 
rank reversals could be justified as natural consequences of rational preference changes when 
there are no mathematical drawbacks involved in the ranking process. 
 
8.2 Some Past Studies on Regret and Rejoicing  
 
Fortunately, there have been many studies on regret and rejoicing in the literature. In 
[Sugden, 1985], regret is defined as “the painful sensation of recognizing that ‘what is’ 
compares unfavorably with ‘what might have been’.” The converse experience of a favorable 
comparison between the two is called “rejoicing”. Some experimental studies confirm that for 
most individuals regret has the greater impact [Mellers, 2000]. In related research, regret is 
also the one that has received most of the attention. The following is a simple introduction to 
some regret models. 
 
One of the earliest regret models is known as the minimax regret model which was 
introduced by Savage [Savage, 1951] and was first axiomatized by Milnor [Milnor, 1954]. 
The minimax regret is a strategy for decision-making under uncertainty whereby the DM 
chooses the alternative with the minimum worst possible outcome in order to minimize regret 
[Kujawski, 2005]. This model defines regret as the difference between the actual performance 
value of each decision alternative and the best possible value among all alternatives for each 
ultimate state of nature. Suppose the utility value of an alternative Ai under a state of nature Sk 
is uik. Then, the decision maker who chooses Ai will experience a level of regret Rik for the 
state of nature Sk where Rik is defined as Rik=maxj(ujk)−uik. Next the DM would first determine 
the possible highest level of regret that could occur to each decision alternative, and then 
chooses the alternative with the minimum of these maximum regret values [Zeelenberg, 
1999].  Because this model decides the selection of alternatives totally by their regret values, 
it may lead to irrational choices. Such as, a small disadvantage in a single decision criterion, 
no matter how large/small its importance is, may eliminate alternatives with more preferable 
performance values under more important criteria [Kujawski, 2005]. Given this undesirable 
property, the minimax regret model has not been used widely.  
  
Later, Loomes and Sugden and also Bell proposed a regret theory (referred as RT-
B/LS) simultaneously in 1982 for rational decision-making under uncertainty [Loomes and 
Sugden, 1982; Bell, 1982 and 1985]. In the RT-B/LS model, regret is defined as a 
psychological reaction that is caused by comparing an outcome under one state with the 
payoff one could have had by making a different choice under the same state. The RT-B/LS 
model assumes that the levels of regret and rejoicing depend on the difference of the utilities 
between what is and what could have been. For example, the associated level of regret when 
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Where uik is the classical utility of the i-th alternative in terms of the j-th criterion, and R(.) is 
a non-decreasing regret function.   
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However, it was illustrated in [Kujawski, 2005] that the RT-B/LS model exhibited 
intransitivity under pairwise comparisons and inconsistencies with some empirical evidence. 
To solve these problems, a new regret model called the Reference-Dependent Regret Model 
(RDRM) was proposed for deterministic decision making. Kujawski illustrated that, in 
general, a person’s level of regret when he/she chooses a multi-attribute alternative often 
depends explicitly on the absolute values of the utilities of the chosen and forgone alternatives 
(i.e., alternatives that were considered but not chosen) rather than simply their differences.  
Thus, in his RDRM model, the anticipated regret when choosing uik and forgoing ujk is 
defined as follows: 
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Where the utility value is between 0 and 1, and G(.) is the regret-building function which 
measures the level of regret referenced to the maximum possible utility normalized to 1 and is 
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The two parameters B and S in the definition of G(.) are determined by querying the decision 
maker about the levels of regret that he/she experiences for each criterion [Kujawski, 2005].  
It can be seen that regret occurs when a given decision alternative is compared with another 
one which has at least one better criterion value. It is claimed that the RDRM model ensures 
the transitive pairwise rankings of three alternatives with any number of criteria ≥ 3 because it 
satisfies a special property of additive transitivity [Kujawski, 2005].   
 
Among the previous regret models, the minimax and the RT-B/LS regret models are 
originally developed for decision making under uncertainty. However, both of them can be 
tailored to be used in deterministic decision-making problems by identifying the states of 
nature with the criteria of a given MCDM problem. As stated in [Kaliszewski and 
Michalowski, 1998], the notion of regret becomes meaningful in deterministic multi-criteria 
decision problems if a notion of state is equated to a notion of attribute, and a state /attribute 
matrix conveys regret type information (for instance, the difference between ideal and actual 
values of attributes). For example, the notion of regret in the RDRM model is defined as 
follows by tailoring Bell’s [1982] notion of anticipated regret for decision-making under 
uncertainty: in the process of choosing a deterministic alternative, a rational individual may 
decide to trade off some benefits and forgo the alternative with the highest total value for a 
more balanced alternative in order to reduce his/her level of anticipated regret [Kujawski, 
2005].  
 
It needs to be noted that the effect of anticipated regret/rejoicing is different from the 
experienced emotions. In deterministic decision-making situations, decision makers do not 
have to experience the emotions in order to be influenced by them. Rather, they can predict 
the emotional consequences of different decision outcomes in advance, and opt for the 
choices that minimize the possibility of negative emotions. Please also note that both the RT-
B/LS and the RDRM models may still exhibit rank reversal problems, but the occurrence of a 
rank reversal is defended as rational for the above two models because they reflect an 
individual’s change of preference in response to rational emotions like the anticipated 
regret/rejoicing. 
 
8.3 The Need to Consider Regret and Rejoicing in MCDM 
 
From the above discussion it is clear that the introduction of regret and rejoicing into 
the decision-making process is based on two key assumptions: 1) people experience the 
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sensations of regret and rejoicing which can influence their current decision making; 2) while 
making decisions people may try to anticipate and take into account feelings like regret and 
rejoicing [Loomes and Sugden, 1982]. Therefore, building an MCDM model that incorporates 
these emotional effects not only provides for a better description of the human behavior in 
decision making, but also offers the DMs the flexibility to trade off some economic benefits 
explicitly in order to gain a state of psychological satisfaction, for prescriptive purposes [Bell, 
1985]. 
 
However, the study of how to incorporate the notion of regret and rejoicing in 
deterministic MCDM models is just at its very beginning. Besides several tentative works on 
this direction [Kujawski, 2005; Kaliszewski and Michalowski, 1998], till now there has not 
been a comprehensive MCDM method that can incorporate the notion of regret and rejoicing 
systematically in the MCDM models for both benefit and cost criteria. Meanwhile, such a 
model should be able to rank decision alternatives in a mathematically stable way. To satisfy 
this requirement, the model should not suffer of the ranking irregularity problems which 
happen with the additive AHP and ELECTRE II and III methods when emotional factors are 
not present to justify those ranking problems. Thus, how to design such an effective regret 
and rejoicing based MCDM model and to which degree these emotional factors should be 
considered in decision-making problems is the subjects of following considerations.  
 
One may think that the RDRM regret model could fill in this void. However, there are 
some constraints about this model which refrain it from being used in general MCDM 
problems.  First of all, utility is an elusive concept for many people. It is not always easy for 
decision makers to find a proper utility function that can appropriately transform criteria 
values with different units into unitless and additive utility values. To solve a decision 
problem, using the original criteria values might be more direct and convenient for decision 
makers. Second, in the RDRM model, the level of regret not only depends on the utilities of 
the chosen and forgone alternatives but also on the maximum possible utilities. For the notion 
of utility, the maximum value is fixed and is always equal to 1. However, for a general 
MCDM problem, the maximum possible values are not always well-defined.  Then the 
ranking result from this method might be arbitrary.  One may think that, instead of using the 
maximum possible criteria values, we can use the maximum criteria values for all currently 
considered alternatives in the RDRM model. However, in this way the ranking result from 
this method may still be unstable. This happens because the maximum values might be 
changed when adding or deleting alternatives, like the normalization factor with the additive 
AHP method might be changed when adding or deleting alternatives. Thus, a new MCDM 
model which does not have the above constraints, while has the ability to deal with the effects 
of regret and rejoicing is long due. 
 
8.4 A Potential Regret and Rejoicing Based MCDM Method 
 
As it has been described previously, one significant factor in people’s decision 
making process is their capacity to anticipate feelings of regret and rejoicing and these 
anticipated feelings may strongly influence people’s choices. Therefore, the goal of the next 
step is to design a new MCDM model that can incorporate the behavioral notion of 
anticipated regret and anticipated rejoicing systematically in the MCDM modeling framework. 
Meanwhile, this model should have some essential properties which current MCDM methods 
do not possess. 
 
Based on some ongoing studies, the new MCDM model is expected to satisfy the 
following conditions: 
1) Besides the usual benefit and cost criteria, the new model should be able to 
incorporate the effects of regret and rejoicing for decision makers who value 
these emotional factors in multi-criteria decision making situations.  
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2) The determination of regret and rejoicing effects should be consistent with 
the fundamentals of behavioral science on this subject.  
3) Rank reversals may occur only as results of readjusting the effects of regret 
and/or rejoicing when the set of the alternatives is altered. 
4) The model should be able to deal with qualitative and quantitative criteria 
expressed in different units of measurement.  
5) The model should not exhibit cyclic preferences when tested under certain 
special test problems. 
 
From condition (1) it follows that the effects of regret and rejoicing need to be 
determined for both benefit and cost criteria. Condition (2) means that the determination of 
the regret/rejoicing effects should follow some of the fundamental studies on people’s 
emotional feelings in behavioral science. Condition (3) may have the following implication: if 
one temporarily ignores the regret / rejoicing effects, then the remaining part of an effective 
MCDM model should not exhibit any undesirable rank reversals when the set of the 
alternatives is altered.  The effects of regret and rejoicing may be ignored if, for instance, their 
presence could be considered negligible when compared to the usual performance values of 
the alternatives under the benefit and cost criteria. Condition (4) dictates that an MCDA 
model should be able to transform measurements expressed in different units into 
dimensionless ones or deal with such different measures in computationally valid ways (i.e., 
not to “add oranges to apples”). Condition (5) means that the new model should not allow 
cyclic preference to happen to symmetric decision problems. 
 
As described before, rank reversals may happen with some additive models (such as 
the ELECTRE II and III models and the additive AHP models) when one considers benefit 
and cost criteria only (i.e., without the regret or rejoicing effects). While some previous 
studies [Triantaphyllou, 2000 and 2001] had found that the multiplicative AHP are immune to 
these ranking problems. Thus, instead of addition the new model will be based on 
multiplication. In this way no matter how the decision matrix is normalized, the ratios of the 
alternatives’ performance values will be kept the same because the normalization factor will 
be cancelled off by using the multiplicative formula. Thus, for decision making problems, all 
variation left is due to the regret and rejoicing effects and that could be justifiable as it would 
not be due to any mathematical artifacts.  
 
Based on the above points, after considering the anticipated regret and rejoicing for 
both benefit and cost criteria for a given MCDM problem which has m alternatives and n 
decision criteria, the equation for computing the final overall performance of each alternative 
by using the multiplicative formula and the benefit to cost approach to deal with conflicting 
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Where,  kw is the weight of the k-th decision criterion; ika is the performance value of the i-th 
alternative in terms of the k-th  criterion.  
ikR is the anticipated regret of the i-th alternative in terms of the k-th  criterion; 
ikJ is the anticipated rejoicing of the i-th alternative in terms of the k-th  criterion; 
B
iJ is the aggregated anticipated rejoicing of alternative Ai under the benefit criteria;  
B
iR is the aggregated anticipated regret of alternative Ai under the benefit criteria; 
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B
iP is the aggregated performance value of the alternative Ai under the benefit criteria;   




iP has the corresponding meaning as the above ones but now in 
terms of the cost criteria.  Furthermore, 
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Where ( , )ik lkR u u  and ( , )ik lkJ u u  are the anticipated regret and rejoicing for a decision maker 
when he/she chooses the i-th alternative and forgoes the j-th alternative in terms of the k-th 
criterion. Meanwhile, it is assumed that the first 1n criteria are benefit criteria and the 
1( 1)n th+ − criterion to the n th− criterion is cost criterion.   
 
In the above equation, a key issue is how to measure regret and rejoicing. One 
commonly used way is to measure them by using a continuous regret function as in the RT/B-
LS and RDRM model. However, the approach of using such a function may have some 
fundamental weaknesses. First of all, the definition of such functions involves the 
determination of certain customizing parameters (like the parameters B and S in the RDRM 
model), as not all decision makers may behave in exactly the same way. Furthermore, it is not 
always clear how such parameters may be determined and whether such functions and their 
parameters should change from one criterion to another criterion within the same decision 
problem and the same decision maker.   
 
Please recall that decision criteria may be quantitative (such as cost, age, weight, 
volume, etc) or qualitative (such as desirability, aesthetic appeal, style, etc). Regret and 
rejoicing are definitely qualitative aspects in decision problems. For qualitative aspects an 
approach proposed by Saaty (as part of the AHP method) [Saaty, 1980; Saaty, 1994] has 
received widespread attention for dealing with qualitative criteria. That approach is based on 
a ratio scale. That is, a decision maker is asked to select a linguistic statement that best 
describes his/her assessment of the relative importance of two alternatives when they are 
considered in terms of a single criterion at a time. In this way, the decision maker has to make 
n(n-1)/2 pairwise comparisons. For each such comparison, the decision maker selects the best 
linguistic statement from a small number of statements (9 to be exact) that best describes a 
given pairwise comparison. This is the concept of the Saaty scale. Each linguistic statement is 
also associated with a numerical value in a way that attempts to reflect the natural importance 
of them. The numerical values are the numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 and their intermediate values 
when the decision maker feels that the best answer lies between two successive linguistic 
choices. The reciprocals of the previous numbers are used too. 
 
Following the same logic as with Saaty’s scale, a similar approach could be used for 
assessing the regret and rejoicing values of the alternatives in terms of a single criterion. 
Where a decision maker is asked to select a linguistic statement that best describes his/her 
assessment of the regret and rejoicing when he/she chooses one alternative and forgoes 
another alternative in terms of a single criterion at a time. More studies on this key issue are 












9. Concluding Remarks 
 
Although MCDM plays a critical role in many real-life problems, it is hard to accept 
an MCDM method as being accurate all the time. The present research results on ELECTRE 
II and III methods complement previous ones and reveal that even more MCDM methods 
suffer of ranking irregularities. The ELECTRE methods are widely used today in practice. 
However, the mathematical processes of these methods are not as exact and stable as they 
were assumed to be. The ranking irregularities found in this thesis should function as a 
warning for people in accepting ELECTRE’s recommendations without questioning their 
validity. One great news is that a journal paper on these studies has been published [Wang 
and Triantaphyllou, 2008] and has already attracted some attention from researchers in this 
area.   
 
As discussed previously, it is unacceptable to have rank reversals happen with the 
ELECTRE II and III methods and the additive AHP method because they are resulted from 
these methods’ own mathematical artifacts.  However, the introduction of the notions of 
regret and rejoicing could be able to offer decision makers the flexibility to change their 
preferences and choices in a rational way. Thus, rank reversals could be justified as natural 
consequences of rational preference changes when there are no mathematical drawbacks 
involved in the ranking process. As discussed in Chapter 8, some new studies on the notion of 
regret and rejoicing are under development. If these studies are carried out successfully, 
hopefully we will be able to offer a new effective MCDM method to the literature and more 
importantly to the users of MCDM methods. This method will not only have the ability to 
incorporate the effects of regret and rejoicing but also be able to refrain the occurrence of 
those previously discussed ranking irregularity problems when the effects of regret and 
rejoicing is negligible. Decision makers will have the flexibility to decide their own 
regret/rejoicing levels and the importance of these emotional factors in their decision-making 
process. 
 
Another direction for future research is to define more test criteria against which 
existing and future MCDM methods can be evaluated. Some interesting work in this area has 
been conducted. For example, in [Kujawski, 2005], the author proposed three properties for a 
desirable MCDM approach. They are about independence of dominated alternatives, no 
imposed rank reversal and negative side effects associated with inferior substitutions. In 
[Kujawski, 2005], it is claimed that the RDRM model satisfies the above three properties. 
According to the first property the RDRM model preserves the ranking of two alternatives Ai 
and Aj with ranking Ai > Aj when a new alternative dominated by Ai is introduced or an old 
alternative dominated by Aj is dropped. However, as our newly studies prove, this claim is not 
always true. A research note is under preparation to demonstrate this point algebraically and 
also by means of a numerical example [Wang, et al., 2007]. The implication of the new 
finding is that the common practice of dropping dominated alternatives may lead to 
misleading conclusions if the analysis involves regret or rejoicing effects. Clearly, it is a 
fascinating area of research and it is of paramount significance to both researchers and 
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